FNNC: Achieving Fairness through Neural Networks

In classification models fairness can be ensured by solving a constrained optimization problem. We focus on fairness constraints like Disparate Impact, Demographic Parity, and Equalized Odds, which are non-decomposable and non-convex. Researchers define convex surrogates of the constraints and then apply convex optimization frameworks to obtain fair classifiers. Surrogates serve only as an upper bound to the actual constraints, and convexifying fairness constraints might be challenging. We propose a neural network-based framework, \emph{FNNC}, to achieve fairness while maintaining high accuracy in classification. The above fairness constraints are included in the loss using Lagrangian multipliers. We prove bounds on generalization errors for the constrained losses which asymptotically go to zero. The network is optimized using two-step mini-batch stochastic gradient descent. Our experiments show that FNNC performs as good as the state of the art, if not better. The experimental evidence supplements our theoretical guarantees. In summary, we have an automated solution to achieve fairness in classification, which is easily extendable to many fairness constraints

Fair Allocation of goods and chores -- Tutorial and Survey of Recent Results

Fair resource allocation is an important problem in many real-world scenarios, where resources such as goods and chores must be allocated among agents. In this survey, we delve into the intricacies of fair allocation, focusing specifically on the challenges associated with indivisible resources. We define fairness and efficiency within this context and thoroughly survey existential results, algorithms, and approximations that satisfy various fairness criteria, including envyfreeness, proportionality, MMS, and their relaxations. Additionally, we discuss algorithms that achieve fairness and efficiency, such as Pareto Optimality and Utilitarian Welfare. We also study the computational complexity of these algorithms, the likelihood of finding fair allocations, and the price of fairness for each fairness notion. We also cover mixed instances of indivisible and divisible items and investigate different valuation and allocation settings. By summarizing the state-of-the-art research, this survey provides valuable insights into fair resource allocation of indivisible goods and chores, highlighting computational complexities, fairness guarantees, and trade-offs between fairness and efficiency. It serves as a foundation for future advancements in this vital field

Combinatorial Civic Crowdfunding with Budgeted Agents: Welfare Optimality at Equilibrium and Optimal Deviation

Civic Crowdfunding (CC) uses the ``power of the crowd'' to garner contributions towards public projects. As these projects are non-excludable, agents may prefer to ``free-ride,'' resulting in the project not being funded. For single project CC, researchers propose to provide refunds to incentivize agents to contribute, thereby guaranteeing the project's funding. These funding guarantees are applicable only when agents have an unlimited budget. This work focuses on a combinatorial setting, where multiple projects are available for CC and agents have a limited budget. We study certain specific conditions where funding can be guaranteed. Further, funding the optimal social welfare subset of projects is desirable when every available project cannot be funded due to budget restrictions. We prove the impossibility of achieving optimal welfare at equilibrium for any monotone refund scheme. We then study different heuristics that the agents can use to contribute to the projects in practice. Through simulations, we demonstrate the heuristics' performance as the average-case trade-off between welfare obtained and agent utility.Comment: To appear in the Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI '23). A preliminary version of this paper titled "Welfare Optimal Combinatorial Civic Crowdfunding with Budgeted Agents" also appeared at GAIW@AAMAS '2

Coordinating Monetary Contributions in Participatory Budgeting

We formalize a framework for coordinating the funding of projects and sharing the costs among agents with quasi-linear utility functions and individual budgets. Our model contains the classical discrete participatory budgeting model as a special case, while capturing other well-motivated problems. We propose several important axioms and objectives and study how well they can be simultaneously satisfied. One of our main results is that whereas welfare maximization admits an FPTAS, welfare maximization subject to a well-motivated and very weak participation requirement leads to a strong inapproximability result. We show that this result is bypassed if we consider some natural restricted valuations or when we take an average-case heuristic approach